In this paper, we consider the fixed-sample and sequential strategies in group search, and we break the conventional wisdom that the sequential search strategy always dominates the fixed-sample strategy. We model group search as a game among group members, and we show that the fixed-sample strategy is preferable to the sequential strategy when the unit search cost (relative to the dispersion of the product value distribution) is very low or high enough. The sequential strategy has the information advantage compared to the fixed-sample strategy because decision makers can make use of information gained during the search process. However, due to the divergence of preferences in group search, the information advantage of the sequential strategy is reduced, whereas the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy emerges: when the unit search cost is large, the fixed-sample strategy commits to a smaller number to search to save search cost, whereas when the unit search cost is small, the fixed-sample strategy chooses a larger number to search than the sequential strategy because it allows group members to commit to a number to search and prevents over-search upfront. Further, we show that our result is robust to a change in the distribution assumption or in the size of the group.
Introduction
The fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy are two common search strategies that are discussed in the literature and are used in reality. The fixed-sample strategy (introduced in Stigler 1961 ) means that decision makers first determine the number to search n, and then they search n products 1 and choose one from them. Under the sequential strategy (introduced in McCall 1970) , decision makers search sequentially, and they decide whether to stop or to continue searching after evaluating each product. It is traditionally believed that the sequential strategy dominates the fixed-sample strategy (e.g. Rothschild 1974 , Gastwirth 1976 , Burdett and Judd 1983 , McCall et al. 2008 because it allows decision makers flexibly decide to stop earlier or later based on the information acquired during the search process. We notice that this belief is made on the premise of single-agent search, i.e., the search process that is conducted by a single decision maker.
However, it is prevalent in our daily life that a group of people with different preference search and make a decision together (we call it "group search"). There has been literature showing that many household purchases involve family or multi-person decision making, especially durable goods purchases, like buying a house or a car (e.g., Davis 1976) . To make the purchase decision, family members need to conduct group search-they go through the process of searching products and making a choice together, although they may have very different preferences. Group search also appears in organizations' collective decision making. For example, when a company or an academic department wants to recruit a new member, they form a hiring committee to evaluate job candidates and make the hiring decision.
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In this paper, we consider the fixed-sample and sequential strategies in group search, and we break the conventional wisdom that the sequential search strategy always dominates the fixed-sample strategy. The idea is that the sequential strategy may result in over-search due each product follow a uniform distribution. Our main finding is that the fixed-sample strategy can be superior the sequential strategy, i.e., leading to higher expected utility for each group member, when the unit search cost is very small or large enough (relative to the dispersion parameter of the value distribution), which is in contrast with the lesson from single-agent search.
We dig into the mechanism underlying the result. We find that the sequential strategy has an information advantage over the fixed-sample strategy because it allows decision makers to make use of the information gained during the search process, and this advantage determines that the sequential strategy dominates the fixed-sample strategy in single-agent search. However, group search has the divergence problem, i.e., group members have distinct preferences and each group member cannot fully decide whether or not to choose a product, so the marginal benefit of searching a product is lower for group search than for single-agent search. Therefore, given any unit search cost, group search evaluates a smaller number of products in equilibrium than single-agent search. Due to the divergence problem of group search, the sequential strategy's information advantage is reduced. At the same time, the fixed-sample strategy's commitment advantage emerges.
• When the unit search cost is relatively large, the fixed-sample strategy commits to a smaller number to search than the sequential strategy 7 to save cost, and the total saved search cost dominates the information advantage of the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is large enough.
• When the unit search cost is relatively small, both strategies choose a relatively large (expected) number to search, but the fixed-sample strategy chooses a even larger number to search than the sequential strategy. The reason is that, under the sequential strategy, group members dare not set the cutoff value high enough because of the risk of over searching caused by the divergence problem among the group members. This is not a concern under the fixed-sample strategy because it allows the group members to commit to the number to search, which prevents over-search upfront. As a result, the fixed-sample strategy can search more products than the sequential strategy on average, and will select a product with higher expected value. This gap increases as the unit search cost becomes even smaller. Thus, when the unit search cost is small enough, the expected utility under the fixed-sample strategy becomes higher than under the sequential strategy.
To summarize, the results on both directions reflect the trade-off between the information advantage of the sequential strategy and the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy, and the key driving force of the difference between group search and single-agent search is the divergence problem of group search.
In the extensions, we first show that our main result is robust to a change in the distribution assumption by considering a typical unbounded distribution of product values, i.e., the exponential distribution. We also extend the group size to M , and we find that the fixed-sample strategy's dominant area at large search cost expands with M (i.e., the lower bound of the unit search cost that makes the fixed-sample strategy preferable to the sequential strategy decrease with M ), whereas the fixed-sample strategy's advantage at very small search cost disappears when M > 2. This is because the divergence problem of group search becomes more severe as the group size gets larger. Thus, the sequential strategy's information advantage is further reduced, and, at the same time, the fixed-sample strategy's commitment advantage at large search cost becomes more salient. Therefore, the fixed-sample strategy is more likely to dominate the sequential strategy at a large search cost as the group size increases. However, for M > 2, when the number to search is relatively large, searching more products will make the group members' votes more dispersed, which decreases the chance of a focal group member's favorite product being selected. Therefore, the fixed-sample strategy's advantage at small search cost disappears because it cannot get higher expected utility by searching more products than the sequential strategy.
Our work contributes to the recent literature on group search (Albrecht et al. 2010 , Compte and Jehiel 2010 , Moldovanu and Shi 2013 . All these existing works consider group search problem under the sequential strategy, whereas our paper considers group search for both the sequential strategy and the fixed-sample strategy. Our work is most related to Albrecht et al. (2010) , who model group search under the framework of sequential search strategy and compared it to single-agent search. They show that the group members are less picky than a single decision maker. Our paper points out this point as well, and more importantly, we show that this difference between group search and single-agent search breaks the conventional wisdom about the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy.
Our paper also contributes to the general search literature by being the first to give a formal analysis concerning the key driving force of the difference between the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy. Although Gastwirth (1976) , Rothschild (1974) , Burdett and Judd (1983), and McCall et al. (2008) have all indicated that the fixed-sample strategy is dominated by the sequential strategy in single-agent search, they make the argument based on either intuition (Gastwirth 1976 , Rothschild 1974 , Burdett and Judd 1983 or numerical analysis (McCall et al. 2008) . By making certain distribution assumptions, we analytically show that the fixed-sample strategy is dominated by the sequential strategy in single-agent search, but it can be better than the sequential strategy in group search. Furthermore, we analytically capture the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy and the information advantage of the sequential strategy, and we show that the fixed-sample strategy's commitment advantage can dominate the sequential strategy's information advantage in group search due to the divergence problem.
Our paper is broadly related to the literature of consumer search (e.g., Kuksov and VillasBoas 2010 , Branco et al. 2012 , Dukes and Liu 2015 , Ke et al. 2016 , Ke and Lin 2018 . Instead of characterizing the amount of information a consumer learns from a product, we assume that the value of a product to a decision maker is fully revealed once the product has been searched, and we use the number of products to search to capture the intensity of a search process. However, the general implication of our model still holds if we use the amount of information to learn to represent the intensity of search.
There have been some empirical papers studying the comparison between the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy, and trying to understand which search strategy consumers really use. Hong and Shum (2006) and Chen et al. (2007) develop methodologies to estimate search costs for both the fixed-sample and the sequential strategy, and to test which strategy is used by consumers. De los Santos et al. (2012) use a large panel data of consumers' web browsing and purchasing behavior to test between the fixed-sample and the sequential strategy models, and their results favor the fixed-sample strategy model. Honka and Chintagunta (2017) also support the fixed-sample strategy model using data from the U.S. auto insurance industry, whereas Bronnenberg et al. (2016) 's results are consistent with the sequential strategy model using a dataset with detailed attribute information of digital cameras and consumers' searching behaviors. Our paper analytically compares the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy and analyzes the underlying trade-off. Our paper implies that the divergence in the empirical findings regarding which search strategy consumers use can potentially be explained by whether it is group search or single-agent search. It also implies the importance of distinguishing between group search and single-agent search when investigating consumers' search behavior.
Broadly speaking, our research is also related with the literature about group decision making and group consumption. There are numerous papers in the fields of management, economics, sociology, and psychology that discuss these topics. We will not provide a detailed review here, but we would stress that our work contributes to the understanding of the search strategy in group decision making.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the main model. Section 3 presents the result of the main model. Section 4 shows that the results are robust to a change in the distribution assumption. Section 5 considers an extension with M group members (M ≥ 2).
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses managerial implications as well as future research directions.
Main Model
We consider the problem in which a group of decision makers (denoted as J) want to choose one product from a set of products (denoted as I). 8 The product values are unknown to group members, so they need to engage in a search process to learn the values of products.
We denote the value of product i to group member j as X ij , which is unknown ex ante, but member j will learn its value once she searches product i. X ij 's are drawn from a common distribution with c.d.f. F (·) and p.d.f. f (·), and the distribution is known to group members.
The support of distribution F (·) is X ⊆ [0, ∞), and F (·) is continuously differentiable on X .
The common distribution assumption implies that the products are homogeneous ex ante, so that the sequence of searching does not matter. 9 We assume that, for any group member j, different products' values X ij 's are independent, so that searching one product does not help to learn the value of other products. We also assume that, for any product i, different group members' valuations X ij 's are independent across j. This implies that group members have heterogeneous tastes, and the products are different horizontally but not vertically.
10
We consider the two most commonly used search strategies both in the literature and in practice, i.e., the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy. Under both strategies, the group members can search and evaluate one product in each period, so that the difference between the two strategies is not driven by their difference in timing. The difference is that, under the sequential strategy, the group members decide whether to stop or to continue searching each time when they have searched a product, whereas under the fixed-sample strategy, group members first set a number to search, then search the pre-determined number of products, and choose one from them.
In both strategies, we assume there is no time discounting, and the loss in utility when searching more products is captured by the search cost. We assume each group member incurs search cost c when the group searches a product. Herein, we assume that searching as a group does not dilute the cost of searching for each group member. The reason is that the cost of searching can be considered as mainly consisting of the cost of time and effort, which cannot be shared between group members. The assumption also implies that, when the group searches a product, all the group members have to be involved, i.e., they cannot search different products separately and then share the searched information with each other because their preferences are heterogeneous and independent.
In our main model, we consider a group with two members (j = A, B), which represents a typical setting where a couple with inconsistent preferences or a group consisting of two parties is making a decision. (We also consider an extension with M group members.) We assume that assumption to show that our result is not driven by the distribution assumption.)
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Next, we describe the group members' search problem under the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy, respectively.
Fixed-sample Strategy
Suppose the group uses the fixed-sample strategy, then the game between the group members proceeds as follows. At stage 1, each group member j first proposes the number of products to search n j , j ∈ {A, B}. The group's choice of the number to search is denoted as n, and we assume that n = n j with equal probability. 12 At stage 2, the number to search n has been determined, and the group searches n products together. After searching n products, each group member j will vote for a product, denoted as product i * j . The product with the largest number of votes will be selected by the group. If there are products that have received the same number of votes, one of them will be selected with equal probability. (the third scenario) will be selected with equal probability. Since the two members' valuations are independent and they make choices without knowing the other member's choice, given A's choice i * A , the n products are still symmetric from B's perspective and have the same probability of being B's favorite product. Therefore, the probabilities of the three scenario are 1/n, (n − 1)/(2n), and (n − 1)/(2n), respectively.
12 As we have posited, each time the group searches a product, every group member must be involved, so the number to search has to be the same for every group members. If the group members have different choice of n j , we can think of them as going through a bargaining process and every group member has equal bargaining power. Thus the group's decision of the number to search will be equal to each member's choice with equal probability.
13 Similar as when deciding the number to search, we can think of the group members going through a bargaining process when there is a tie in the voting, and every group member has equal bargaining power. For tractability, we do not explicitly model the bargaining process; rather, we summarize the group decision as a probabilistic outcome. Furthermore, we consider c as the cost of searching each product without explicitly considering the cost of voting and bargaining.
Then group member A's expected utility EU AF (n):
because the group members' preferences and votes are independent. Thus, the n − 1 products not voted by A are symmetric from A's perspective ex ante, and they have the same chance of being voted by B. Equation (1) indicates
. Therefore, A's optimal strategy at stage 2 is to vote for the product from which she draws the highest value out of the n products.
By symmetry, B's expected utility has a symmetric formula, and her optimal strategy at stage 2 is also to vote for the one from which she draws the highest value. That is, for each member
14 Then both group members' expected utility given n is
The last term represents the search cost, and the first two terms indicate that, for a twomember group fixed-sample search, the selected product has 1/2 chance of being the focal group member's favorite and has 1/2 chance of being an "average" product for the focal group member.
Moving backward to stage 1, when proposing the number to search, each group member j
Without being able to affect n −j , member j just chooses n j to maximize EU F (n j ). Thus, the two group members will choose the same number to search in equilibrium, i.e., n * A = n * B ≡ n * F . Denote n F as the maximizer of EU F (n) without the integer constraint. Then n F satisfies the first order condition (F.O.C.)
14 Satterthwaite (1975) and Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show that group members can vote strategically to manipulate the final outcome. In our model, each group member truthfully votes for her favorite product since group members' preferences are independent and a group member does not know the preference rankings of the other members ex ante.
15 Thus, the group chooses n * F = n F or n F , depending on which one leads to a higher EU F .
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Sequential Strategy
If the group uses the sequential strategy instead, the game proceeds as follows. In each period, the group members search one product, and each group member votes for one of the two options,
i.e., 1) to continue searching or 2) to stop at the current product. The option that gets the higher number of votes will be chosen by the group; if there is a tie between the two options, one of them will be chosen with equal probability. For a group with two members, if both group members agree to stop (continue), then the group will stop (continue) searching, whereas if the two group members' votes go against each other, the group may stop or continue with equal probability. 17 We assume no recall here, i.e., once the group decides to continue searching, the current product is discarded and cannot be selected later. This is a reasonable assumption since the group cannot force the seller side to wait without a commitment on the stopping time, i.e., products that have been passed are likely to be taken by others and no longer available.
Given that there is no recall and the products are ex ante homogeneous, we can focus on Markovian equilibria (Albrecht et al. 2010) . 18 Since it is an infinite-horizon dynamic game, each group member's equilibrium strategy will be a stationary cutoff strategy. That is, group member j will set a cutoff value and will vote to stop as long as the product's value to her exceeds the cutoff value. By symmetric, we can think from group member A's perspective without loss of generalizability. We denote group member A's cutoff value as ξ, group member 15 Notice that the expectation for any non-negative random variable Y with c.
Therefore, the second order derivative of EU F (n) is
2 dx, which is negative given that 0 ≤ F (x) ≤ 1. Hence, the solution to the F.O.C. is unique, and it maximizes EU F .
16 Notice that we restrict the range of c such that searching is beneficial, which implies that n * F cannot be zero or negative.
B's cutoff value as ξ , and V (ξ; ξ ) as group member A's expected utility of continuing search.
Under Markov strategies, V (ξ; ξ ) does not depend on how many products have been searched or what the draws were.
First, we can show that ξ = V (ξ; ξ ) must hold in equilibrium. Denote p s (ξ ) as the probability for the group to stop at a product conditional on that group member A votes to stop, and p c (ξ ) as the probability for the group to stop conditional on that group member A votes to continue. In equilibrium, when the draw is ξ, group member A's expected utility of voting to stop should be equal to her expected utility of voting to continue. That is,
Second, according to the definition,
where the second line is the expected utility if the next draw is higher than ξ and the third line is the expected utility if the next draw is lower than ξ.
By symmetry, the two group members employ symmetric strategies. Then the two group members have the same cutoff value, i.e., ξ = ξ , and each member knows that the other member's cutoff value is the same as hers. Denote V (ξ) ≡ V (ξ; ξ). The equilibrium cutoff value satisfies ξ = V (ξ). Combining this with equation (3), the equilibrium cutoff value ξ * solves the equation
The expected utility from the group sequential search is EU * S = ξ * .
Given that the cutoff values of both group members are ξ * , the probability that the group will stop searching in a period is (1 − F (ξ
. Hence the number of products to search follows a geometric distribution G(1−F (ξ * )), and the expectation
. Therefore, the last term in equation (4) represents the expected search cost.
The first two terms imply that, for a two-member group sequential search, the selected product has 1/2 chance of being satisfactory to the focal group member (i.e., exceeds her threshold), and has 1/2 chance of being an "average" product for the focal group member.
Fixed-sample versus Sequential Strategy
Having understood the game between the group members under fixed-sample and sequential strategies, now we compare these two strategies to determine which one leads to a higher expected utility for each group member. To make the comparison between the two strategies feasible, we assume that the distribution
, where µ and d > 0 capture the mean and the dispersion of the distribution respectively.
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Before comparing the two strategies in group search, we first consider their comparison in single-agent search and take it as a benchmark. Then we investigate how group search differs from single-agent search and how the difference shapes the comparison between the two strategies in group search.
Benchmark: Single-Agent Search
For the problem of single-agent search, all the assumptions are the same as in our main model for group search except that there is only a single decision maker. If the decision maker uses the fixed-sample strategy, she chooses n s * F ∈ Z + to maximize her expected utility
19 The reason why we have to make a specific distribution assumption is that we cannot compare E[max{X 1 , ..., X n }] and E[X|X ≥ ξ] under a general distribution assumption. In Section 4, we will show that our result is not driven by the distribution assumption and that it still holds under a typical unbounded distribution.
Suppose n s F is the solution to the F.O.C.
whichever leads to a higher EU s F . If the decision maker uses the sequential strategy, she sets a cutoff value ξ * that satisfies
(The detailed analysis and proof are available in Appendix.) We compare the decision maker's expected utility in the two search strategies under the uniform distribution assumption, and obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. Suppose product values are i.i.d. and follow a uniform distribution
When the search is conducted by a single agent, the sequential strategy always dominates the fixed-sample strategy, i.e., the expected utility under the sequential strategy is higher than under the fixed-sample strategy given any unit search cost c ∈ (0, min{µ, d}).
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Having the result in Lemma 1, we have proven the classic result that the sequential strategy dominates the fixed-sample strategy for single-agent search in a rigorous way.
To understand the comparison between the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy in single-agent search, we compare the decision maker's expected utility under the two strategies when the number to search is fixed at a given n for both strategies, i.e., to compare EU s F (n) and EU s S (n). Notice that for the sequential strategy, n means the expected number to search and its relationship with the cutoff value ξ is n = 1
For the fixed-sample strategy, EU s F (n) = E max (n) − cn. Given the same n, the search cost term is the same for both strategies, so we only need to compare EV
, the expected value of the selected product when the (expected) number to search is n. Under the uniform distribution assumption, EV
n) for any n ≥ 1. This exactly illustrates the flexibility/information advantage of the sequential strategy. When paying the same search cost, the sequential strategy will get a higher expected value from the selected product than the fixed-sample strategy because the 20 (0, min{µ, d}) is the range of unit search cost in which the search is beneficial for the decision maker.
former uses information collected during the search process. In other words, given any n, in the fixed-sample strategy, it means that the decision maker must search exactly n products, whereas, in the sequential strategy, the decision maker can decide to stop earlier if she has already found a good enough product or she can stop later if the searched products are not good enough -with the mean number to search being n, the decision maker can endogenously determine the stopping time based on the revealed product values, and apparently it will lead to a higher expected value from the selected product. Due to this information advantage, the sequential strategy is always preferable to the fixed-sample strategy in single-agent search. The comparison between the two strategies in single-agent search can serve as a benchmark for us to understand their comparison in group search.
How Group Search Differs From Single-Agent Search
Before trying to understand the comparison between the fixed-sample and sequential strategies in group search, we still need to know how group search differs from single-agent search. We compare group search to single-agent search in terms of the expected utility as well as the (expected) number to search in equilibrium under both strategies, and we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2. For both the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy, given any unit search cost c, group search chooses a smaller (expected) number of products to search in equilibrium and leads to a lower expected utility than single-agent search.
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At first glance, the result looks surprising, i.e., a group searches fewer products than a single agent although it is harder for the group to converge on a decision, but, actually, this result is reasonable. Due to the divergence between group members, a group member cannot fully decide on choosing a product even if the product is of the highest value to her (under the fixedsample strategy) or exceeds the cutoff value (under the sequential strategy). Therefore, for each group member, the marginal benefit of searching a product is lower in group search than it is 21 The latter part means that each group member's expected utility in group search is lower than the decision maker's expected utility in single-agent search.
in single-agent search. (Table 1 shows that, from single-agent search to the two-member group search, the marginal benefit is reduced by half at any given n.) Thus, group search evaluates fewer products than single-agent search in equilibrium. Given a smaller number to search and lower marginal benefit from searching each product, the expected utility of group search will also be lower than that of single-agent search. To summarize, Lemma 2 reflects the impact of the divergence problem of group search. 
and n = 1/(1 − F (ξ))
Fixed-sample versus Sequential Strategy in Group Search
Now we compare the fixed-sample strategy and sequential strategy in group search. Specifically, we compare each group member's expected utility under the two strategies, EU F (n * F ) and EU S (ξ * ), for c ∈ (0, min{µ, d}), which is the range of unit search cost such that both strategies are well-defined. A challenge in the comparison is the integer roundness of n * F in the fixed-sample strategy. However, we notice that EU F (n * F ) is bounded above by EU F (n F ), where n F is the maximizer of EU F (·) without the integer constraint, and is bounded below by max{EU F (n F − 1), EU F (n F + 1)} since EU F (n) is a concave function. Thus, we make use of the lower bound of EU F (n * F ) to prove that EU F (n * F ) must be higher than EU S (ξ * S ) for a certain range of c, and we use the upper bound to pin down the range of c. The result is summarized as below, and the detailed proof is presented in the Appendix. When the search is conducted by a group with two group members, the fixed-sample strategy can lead to higher expected utility than the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is low enough (i.e., c ∈ (0,âd), where 0.01 <â < 0.014), or high enough (i.e., c ∈ (d/3, min{µ, d})) relative to the dispersion of the product value distribution. When c is in the middle range, the sequential strategy dominates the fixed-sample strategy.
Notice that the dispersion parameter d actually captures the potential benefit from the search -decision makers gain more from the search when they have more uncertainty about the product values ex ante. Thus Proposition 1 shows that in group search, the fixed-sample strategy dominates the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is low enough or high enough relative to the potential benefit from the search.
Now we try to understand the intuition behind the comparison of the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy. Table 1 clearly shows that, compared to single-agent search, the information advantage of the sequential strategy is reduced by half in group search due to the divergence problem. At the same time, the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy emerges. Notice that both the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy reduce the number to search in group search (i.e., n * F < n s * F , n * S < n s * S ) compared to single-agent search. With the ability to commit to a number to search, the fixed-sample strategy reduces the number to search in a smaller scale than the sequential strategy (0 < n
when the unit search cost is relatively small: under the sequential strategy, the group members significantly lower their cutoff value (which is equivalent to choosing a smaller expected number to search) because they know that setting a high cutoff value is likely to lead to over-search due to the divergence problem, whereas, in the fixed-sample strategy, they can choose a large enough number to search since they have the commitment power to prevent over-search upfront.
Thus, when the unit search cost is small, the fixed-sample strategy can get a higher expected value from the selected product than the sequential strategy, and when the unit search cost is small enough, the expected utility of the fixed-sample strategy can be higher than that of the sequential strategy. On the other hand, when the unit search cost is relatively large, the fixed-sample strategy commits to reduce the number to search in an even larger magnitude (n s * F − n * F > n s * S − n * S > 0) to save cost, and the expected utility under the fixed-sample strategy can be higher than that of the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is sufficiently large.
The results on both directions -when the unit search cost is very small or large enough -reflects the fixed-sample strategy's advantage of being able to commit to the number to search, so we call it the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy.
To summarize, due to the divergence problem of group search, the information advantage of the sequential strategy is reduced, whereas the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy emerges and it dominates the information advantage of the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is very small or large enough. Therefore the fixed-sample strategy can be superior to the sequential strategy in these two scenarios.
Alternative Distribution Assumption
In the main model, under the assumption that the product values follow a uniform distribution, we show that the fixed-sample strategy can lead to higher expected utility than the sequential strategy in group search when the unit search cost is low enough or high enough. To show that the results are not driven by the distribution assumption, we now consider a typical unbounded distribution on (0, ∞): We assume that product value X ij 's follow an exponential distribution Exp(λ) (λ > 0). Notice that 1/λ measures the dispersion of the exponential distribution 22 , and, therefore, it also represents the potential benefit from searching.
Proposition 2. Suppose product values are i.i.d. and follow an exponential distribution Exp(λ)
(λ > 0). For single-agent search, the sequential strategy always dominates the fixed-sample strategy (for any unit search cost when search is beneficial, i.e., c ∈ (0, 1/λ)). For group search with two group members, the fixed-sample strategy can lead to higher expected utility than the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is low enough (i.e., c ∈ (0, c 0 ), c 0 <
2λ
) or high enough (i.e., c ∈ (c 1 ,
), c 1 >
) relative to the dispersion of product value distribution.
When c is in the middle range, the sequential strategy is preferable to the fixed-sample strategy.
The detailed proof is available in the Appendix. Apparently, the results in Proposition 2 are consistent with Proposition 1, which confirms that our conclusion is not driven by the distribution assumption.
22 The standard deviation of exponential distribution Exp(λ) is 1/λ.
M -Member Group Search
In the main model, we assume that the group consists of two members. Now, we extend our model to the case in which there are M group members (M ≥ 2).
Let's reiterate how the game proceeds for the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy in the M -member group case.
• For the fixed-sample strategy, each group member j first proposes the number of products to search n j , and the group's choice of number to search n will be equal to each n j with equal probability (1/M ). Then all group members together search n products. After searching all n products, each group member votes for a product. The product with the most votes wins. If there are multiple products with the same number of votes, one of these products will be selected with equal probability.
• For the sequential strategy, in each period, the group members search one product together, and then each group member votes to continue searching or to stop at the current product. If the number of votes to stop is larger, the group stops searching and the current product is selected. If the number of votes to continue is larger, the group continues searching. If the two options have the same number of votes, the group may continue or stop with equal probability.
In both strategies, the equal-probability random selection in the case of a tie is an abstraction of the result of Nash bargaining. For both search strategies, we still focus on symmetric purestrategy equilibria.
We first investigate the fixed-sample search. The same as in the main model, we solve by backward induction. That is, assuming the group has decided to search n products, we investigate each member's optimal voting strategy and calculate the expected utility of each group member as a function of n. Then we determine the n that maximizes the expected utility.
Group members are symmetric, so we can consider the voting strategy and expected utility of a representative group member A without loss of generalizability. Also, all products are symmetric ex ante, so we can assume product 1 as the winning product (the product finally selected by the group) without loss of generalizability. We denote W 1 as the event that product 1 wins, v 1 as the number of votes that product 1 gets, and V A 1 as the event that A votes for product 1. By symmetry,
Notice that line (7) also makes use of the fact that the M members are symmetric -when there are k members voting for the winning product, the probability of member A being one of them is k/M . Recall that i * A is the product that A votes for under her optimal voting strategy, and E[X i * A ,A ] represents the value of that product to A. Apprarently, to maximize the expected utility, the optimal voting strategy for A (and for every member) is to vote for the product from which she draws the highest value. That is, E[X i * j ,j ] = E max (n), ∀j. Denote v * M (n) as the number of votes that the winning product gets given that there are n products being evaluated by the M -member group. By symmetry of products, E[v *
When there are two group members (M = 2), it is easy to verify that this equation is consistent with equation (1). 23 For a general case of M > 2, n > 2, we cannot give a closed-form solution
24 It is easy to see that M/n < E[v * M (n)] < M since M is the total number of votes and M/n is the average number of votes per product. Equation (9) implies that the selected product is with chance
a focal group member's favorite, and with chance
an "average" product for the focal group member. For a given n, when the group size gets larger (M gets larger), the group members' votes are less likely to coincide. Thus, E[v * M (n)] is closer to M/n, and the latter probability will be larger, so the selected product is more likely to be an "average" product for the focal group member, and her expected value from the selected product leans more towards E[X]. Since we cannot give a closed-form solution of E[v * M (n)], we cannot derive the optimal number of products to search n * F for a general M > 2.
We will use numerical simulation to conduct the analysis. Now we consider the sequential search. First, we consider the case that M is an odd number, i.e., M = 2m + 1. Then the group stops searching if and only if at least m + 1 members vote to stop. We consider the decision and expected utility of a representative group member. Assume the representative's cutoff value is ξ. By symmetry, all members' cutoff values are ξ. The value function of continuing search is V (ξ). We have proven in Section 3 that V (ξ) = ξ.
By definition of V (ξ),
where
is the probability that at least k other members vote to stop, and P i is the probability that exactly i other members vote to stop product gets two votes and there is 1 − 1 n chance that the winning product gets one vote. Then (9) implies that EU F (n) = 1 2 E max (n) + 1 2 E[X] − cn, which is consistent with (1). 24 This is called the "balls-into-bins" problem, a classic problem in probability theory, which means placing M balls into n bins. There is no closed-form solution for the expected maximum number of balls in a bin, i.e., E[v * M (n)], and there is a stream of literature in Mathematics that tries to give the asymptotics (e.g., Raab and Steger 1998) .
(i = 0, 1, ..., M − 1). Making use of the fact that Q m = Q m+1 + P m , we solve (10) and get
.
(11)
) is the probability of stopping at a product given the cutoff value ξ, so
is the expected search cost.
is the chance that the product selected by the group is satisfactory (i.e., its value exceeds the cutoff) for the focal group member, whereas
is the chance that the selected product is an "average" product for the focal group member. When M (m) becomes larger, P m is smaller compared to Q m+1 .
becomes larger, i.e., the selected product is more likely to be an "average" product for the focal group member. This implies that, given any ξ, V (ξ) becomes smaller when m becomes larger. The equilibrium cutoff value ξ * is determined by the crossing point of two functions, y = V (ξ) and y = ξ. Hence, when m becomes larger, ξ * decreases. In other words, when the group size is larger, each group member will lower the cutoff value and will also have a lower expected utility from the sequential search.
Next, we consider the case that M is an even number, i.e., M = 2m. Notice that there can be a tie between the number of votes to stop and the number of votes to continue, and the group will stop/continue with 1/2 probability. Similarly, we can write down two equations regarding ξ and V (ξ). We get ξ = V (ξ) and
P m = Q m is the probability of stopping at a product.
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Similarly,
Pm Qm is the chance that the selected product is an "avearge" product for the focal group member. As M (m) increases, Q m+1 + 1 2 P m becomes larger relative to 1 2 (P m + P m−1 )(1 − F (ξ)) for any given ξ, and then the expected value of the selected product leans more towards E [X] . Thus, the same as in the odd-M case, V (ξ) decreases with m and ξ * decreases with m.
Recall that, for a general M > 2, we cannot analytically solve for the optimal number to search n * F and the corresponding expected utility under the fixed-sample strategy since there is no closed form solution of E[v * M (n)], so we have to rely on numerical simulation to compare the expected utility of the fixed-sample strategy versus that of the sequential strategy. Following the main model, we assume
We simulate the procedure of "M balls into n bins" for T = 1000 times to get the numerical value of E[v * M (n)], and then calculate the expected utility under the fixed-sample strategy EU F (n) for any given n = 1, ...,n according to equation (9), wheren is an arbitrary upper bound of the possible optimal value of n and is set asn = 30 * M here. Then we select the optimal number n * F that maximizes EU F (n). For sequential search, we solve for EU * S = ξ * according to equation (11) is preferable to the sequential strategy. Figure 1 shows that no matter when M is even or M is odd, the cutoff a M decreases with M . In other words, the fixed-sample strategy's dominant area at large search cost expands as M becomes larger. However, the fixed-sample strategy's advantage at very small c disappears when M > 2. That is, for M > 2, the sequential strategy is always preferable to the fixed-sample strategy when the unit search cost is small. The following proposition states our key finding.
Proposition 3. When M ≥ 2, either when M is even or M is odd, the fixed-sample strategy's dominant area at large search cost can expand with M (i.e., the lower bound of c/d that makes the fixed-sample strategy better than the sequential strategy decreases with M ).
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The intuition about the tradeoff between the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy still applies here. As M increases, the divergence problem of group search becomes more
severe, which makes commitment more important. Thus, the fixed-sample strategy's costsaving effect at high unit search cost becomes more salient, so its dominant area at large unit search cost expands as M increases. However, the fixed-sample strategy's advantage at small unit search cost disappears. The reason is that, in this range, the number to search is relatively large. For the fixed-sample strategy, searching more products will make the group members' votes more dispersed, which will decrease the chance of the focal member's favorite product being selected. When the number to search and the group size are relatively large, this negative effect can be larger than the positive effect of giving her more options to choose from. Therefore, the marginal benefit of searching one more product can even be negative for the fixed-sample strategy when M > 2 and n is relatively large (i.e., when c is low). Hence the fixed-sample strategy's advantage brought by searching more products than the sequential strategy at low unit search cost disappears when M > 2.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider the fixed-sample and sequential strategies in group search, and break the conventional wisdom that the sequential strategy always dominates the fixed-sample strategy. We show that, for a two-member group search, the fixed-sample strategy can be preferable to the sequential strategy when the unit search cost is very small or large enough relative to the dispersion of the product value distribution. By further digging into the tradeoff between these two strategies, we show that the sequential strategy has an information advantage, which makes it dominate the fixed-sample strategy in single-agent search. However, for group search, due to the divergence in preferences between group members, the sequential strategy's information advantage is reduced. Furthermore, the fixed-sample strategy's commitment advantage emerges-when the unit search cost is large, it allows the group members to commit to a smaller number to search to save the search cost, and when the unit search cost is small, it allows the group members to choose a larger number to search without being concerned about potential over-search brought by the divergence problem. When the unit search cost is large enough or is very small, the commitment advantage of the fixed-sample strategy dominates the information advantage of the sequential strategy, and the fixed-sample strategy is preferable to the sequential strategy.
Our results are robust to the distribution assumption. We further extend our model to the case of M group members (M ≥ 2), and show that the fixed-sample strategy' dominant area at large search cost expands with M , whereas its dominant area at very small search cost disappears when M > 2. The changes in both directs are due to a more severe divergence problem when the group size becomes larger.
Our results have real-world implications in several dimensions. First, we provide a general guidance on what strategy a group should employ when they conduct group search to make a collective decision. Second, our results shed light on how a seller should guide consumer searches when consumers are involved in household purchases and the household members make the purchase decision together. Last but not least, the results can help us understand some empirical facts, e.g., why employers often use the fixed-sample strategy to search job candidates as is done in the academic job market.
We can see two future research directions. One is to consider the optimal group search strategy in a general sense, instead of within fixed-sample or sequential strategies. The other is to empirically model group search and test which search strategy is used in a group search setting (e.g., household purchases of durable goods, organizational decisions, etc.).
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Under the fixed-sample strategy, the decision maker chooses n to maximize the expected utility,
i.e.,
where EU s F (n) denotes the decision maker's expected utility under single-agent fixed-sample search given the number of products to search n. The optimal n under single-agent fixedsample search is denoted as n s * F .
Since the c.d.f. of max{X 1 , ..., X n } is (F (x)) n , we can get the expression of E max (n) as
Based on this formula, we consider E max (n) as a function of n where n needs not to be an integer. Suppose n Under the sequential strategy, following McCall (1970) , we know that the decision maker's problem is equivalent to choosing the cutoff value between to continue or to stop searching.
Denote the cutoff value as ξ s . By definition of ξ s , the decision maker's expected utility of stopping at ξ s equals the expected utility of continuing searching, i.e., ξ
denotes the continuation value given that the cutoff value is ξ s . Furthermore, according to the definition of V (ξ s ), we have
Combining the two definition equations, we know that the cutoff value under single-agent A-1 sequential strategy ξ s * is the solution to the following equation
The decision maker's expected utility under single-agent sequential strategy is ξ s * .
Given the cutoff value ξ s * , the probability of stopping searching at each period (i.e., after each product being evaluated) is 1 − F (ξ s * ). Hence the number of products to search follows
, and the expected number of products to search is n
We now compare the two strategies. Notice that under the uniform distribution assumption,
Under the fixed-sample strategy, the decision maker's problem is max 
Notice that when 0 < c ≤ min{ Under the sequential strategy, the decision maker chooses cutoff value ξ s * that satisfies
. It is straightforward to solve the equation and get EU
The expected number of products to search is n
Combining the two types of search, we restrict our attention to c ∈ (0, min{µ, d}), and will prove that for any c ∈ (0, min{µ, d}), EU
The mapping between X i and Y i is strictly increasing, so if X i * = max{X 1 , ..., X n }, we must have
A-2
In fact, when c ∈ (0, min{
To summarize, for any c where single-agent fixed-sample search and sequential search are meaningful, the sequential strategy results in higher expected utility than the fixed-sample strategy, i.e., EU
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We prove this lemma without making a specific distribution assumption. That is, the result holds for a general product value distribution.
Fixed-sample search
We first compare single-agent and group search under the fixed-sample strategy.
decreases with n, and therefore n F < n s F . Now we want to prove that n *
There are two cases.
• If there exists at least one integer in the interval (n F , n s F ), then n *
• If there is no integer between n F and n s F , then there must exist some n 0 such that
To summarize, n *
A-3
To compare the expected utilities, we have
where line (A4) is due to E[X] ≤ E max (n * F ), and line (A5) is because n s *
To summarize, under the fixed-sample strategy, group members evaluate (weakly) less products and get (weakly) lower expected utility than a single agent.
Sequential search
Now we compare single-agent and group search under the sequential strategy.
In single-agent sequential search, the cutoff value ξ s * satisfies ξ
In group sequential search, the cutoff value ξ
Notice that we restrict the threshold to be in the meaningful range, i.e., inf(X ) ≤ ξ ≤ sup(X ) where inf(X ) means the largest lower bound of X , and sup(X ) means the smallest upper bound of X . E[X] = E[X|X ≥ ξ] only when ξ = inf(X ), i.e., the equality in (A7) holds only when
To compare ξ s * and ξ * , we denote function h(ξ) = ∞ ξ xdF (x) − (1 − F (ξ))ξ, and check that
That is, h(ξ) (weakly) decrease in ξ. Then combining (A6) and (A7) we can get that ξ * ss ≥ ξ * cs , and the equality holds only when ξ s * = ξ * = inf(X ).
A-4
Given a cutoff value ξ, both in single-agent and group search, the number of products to search follows Geometric distribution
Notice that on X , f (x) > 0 and thus F (x) is strictly increasing.
To summarize, under the sequential strategy, group members set a (weakly) lower cutoff value than a single agent. As a result, group members get a (weakly) lower expected utility and evaluate (weakly) smaller number of products in expectation compared to a single agent.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Under the uniform distribution assumption, each group member's problem under the fixed-sample strategy is max n∈Z + EU F (n) = 1 2
− 1 maximizes EU F if the integer restriction is ignored. The optimal number of products to search is n * F = n F or n F , whichever leads to higher EU F (n). The expected utility from the optimal fixed-sample strategy is EU F (n *
, n F ≥ 1, and then n * F ≥ 1; when d 4 < c < µ, 0 < n F < 1, EU F (1) = µ − c > 0, so n * F = 1, and EU F (n * F ) = µ − c; when c ≥ µ, the group would rather not search.
Using the sequential strategy by group, each group member's optimal cutoff value ξ * satisfies
, which is ξ * = µ + 1 3 (2d − √ 24cd + d 2 ) under our uniform distribution assumption, and it is also the expected utility from the optimal sequential strategy by group. The expected number of products to search is n *
We restrict our attention on the range of c such that both the fixed-sample strategy and the sequential strategy are well-defined, i.e., c ∈ (0, min{µ, d}), and we want to compare EU F (n * F )
with EU S (n * S ) for this range of c. For conciseness, we use a = c/d instead of c in analysis. A challenge in the comparison is brought by the integer roundness of n * F with the fixed-sample strategy when a ∈ (0, 1/4). However, we notice that EU F (n * F ) is bounded above by EU F (n F ) = A-5
, and bounded below by max{EU
} since EU F (n) is a concave function. Thus, we make use of the lower bound of EU F (n * F ) to prove that EU F (n * F ) must be higher than EU S (n * S ) for certain range of c, and use the upper bound to pin down the range of c.
We first consider a ∈ (
, in which range n * F = 1:
where in the last step we replace a with 1 24
and only if 3 < t < 5, which is equivalent to 1 3 < a < 1. Therefore, when a ∈ (
Then we consider a ∈ (0,
], in which range n F ≥ 1. We denote
and
We notice that lim a→0 f 1 (a) = d/6 > 0 and lim a→0 f 2 (a) = d/6 > 0. It is easy to see that both f 1 (a) and f 2 (a) are continuous on (0, 1/4]. Then there must existâ j > 0 such that f j (a) > 0 for any a ∈ (0,â j ) (j = 1, 2). Letâ = max{â 1 ,â 2 } > 0. For any a ∈ (0,â), EU F (n * F ) − EU S (n * S ) ≥ max{f 1 (a), f 2 (a)} > 0. We check that f 1 (0.01) > 0 and f 1 (a) is a decreasing function on a ∈ [0, 1], so we must haveâ > 0.01.
A-6
On the other hand, ], EU F (n * F ) < EU S (n * S ). In other words, theâ we get in the last paragraph must be smaller than 0.014.
To conclude, EU F (n * F ) > EU S (n * S ) when c ∈ (
, min{µ, d}) and c ∈ (0,âd), where 0.01 < a < 0.014. When c ∈ (0.014d,
), EU F (n * F ) < EU S (n * S ).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In group fixed-sample search, each group member's problem is max n∈Z + EU F (n) = ]. Although we are not able to get a closed-form solution of ξ * from g(ξ * ) = 0, we can compared EU F (n * F ) with EU S (n * S ) = ξ * S by comparing g(EU F (n * F )) with 0, making use of the fact that g(ξ) is strictly increasing.
Notice that EU F (n * F ) > EU F (n F + 1) and EU F (n * F ) > EU F (n F − 1). Thus, if we can prove that there exists 0 < c ≤ 1 2λ
such that g(EU F (n F + 1)) > 0 or g(EU F (n F − 1)) > 0, then the corresponding c also leads to g(EU F (n * F )) > 0 and hence implies EU F (n * F ) > ξ * . In fact, g(EU F (n F − 1)) = g( log ( 1 2λc ) + c) = ], g(EU F (n F − 1)) > 0 and therefore EU F (n * F ) − EU S (n * S ) > 0.
On the other hand, EU F (n * F ) < EU F (n F ) = [log( 
